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We use the concept of niche construction—the process whereby individuals, through
their activities, interactions, and choices, modify their own and each other’s environments—as an example of how biological evolution and cultural evolution interacted to
form an integrative foundation of modern organizational leadership. Resulting adaptations are formal structures that facilitate coordination of large, postagrarian organizational networks. We provide three propositions explaining how leadership processes
evolve over time within and between organizations in order to solve specific coordination
problems. We highlight the balancing act between self-interests and group interests in
organizations and show how leadership must regulate this tension to maintain organizational fitness. We conclude with predictions about the future evolution of leadership in
organizations.

Our contribution focuses on integrated theory
building, where multiple elements of the leadership phenomenon, such as individual agents,
context, and dynamic interactions, are considered simultaneously (e.g., Avolio, 2007; Lord,
Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001). In existing theories
scholars have been slow to adopt this approach.
One problem is a focus on near-term “how”
questions, as opposed to ultimate “why” questions concerning leader-follower motives and
interactions. Instead of asking questions regarding “how transformational and transactional
leadership dimensions differ” (e.g., Judge & Piccolo, 2004), we seek to analyze “why different
leadership behaviors emerge in the first
place”—a question that requires a deeper consideration of leadership as an evolving process.
A related issue is the scarcity of interdisciplinary treatments, where new concepts and approaches are brought into the fold of traditional
perspectives. This deficit can promote significant miscalculations of organizational management. For example, previous theories focusing
primarily on rational agency overlook the noneconomic complexities of the manager-subordi-

Leadership is an important factor contributing
to organizational success, yet after centuries of
inquiry, leadership theory remains underdeveloped. In response, scholars are generating a
growing body of literature on leadership in their
attempt to create a more unified theory by highlighting evolutionary processes that are germane to both the biological and cultural dimensions of human behavior (e.g., Nicholson, 2011;
Spisak, Nicholson, & van Vugt, 2011; van Vugt,
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). These initiatives fit comfortably with Suddaby, Hardy, and Huy’s (2011:
244) point that “it is now time for less consolidation and more provocation” in theory development in the organizational sciences. In this article we combine insights derived from
biological science with existing organizational
theory to model the evolution of leadership and
its impact on organizational change.

We thank former associate editor Neal Ashkanasy and
three anonymous reviewers for extremely helpful comments
on various drafts. We also thank Richard Arvey, Daniel Balliet, Nancy Blaker, Joep Cornelissen, Allen Grabo, Omar
Solinger, and Joshua Tybur for their insightful feedback.
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nate interaction (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).
Integrated theory building also moves analytic interest well past excessive “gap spotting”
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), which tends to generate suboptimal theory because it underplays
the dynamic nature of leadership in organizations (Avolio, 2007; Whetten, 1989). As a consequence of this shortcoming, scholars often frame
leadership more in person than in process
terms, inviting fundamental attribution errors,
such as emphasizing the causal effect of specific leaders on coordination to the exclusion of
other situational factors like group size (see Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, & Knez, 2001). Scholars also tend to focus attention more proximately on how leadership operates in a given
context, rather than on the complex dynamics
linking these individual observations (for an exception see Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).
Thus, a static approach makes it difficult to account for the changing nature of the organizational environment.
Solving these problems requires us to consider how and why varying forms of leadership
develop across organizations over time. We
adopt the perspective that evolution has endowed humans with attributes and capabilities
that govern how we interact with one another
in organizations (e.g., Pierce & White, 1999). In
this view cultural evolution is an adaptive
extension of biological evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Laland & Brown, 2011;
Mesoudi, 2011), with both being governed by the
same processes: variation, heritability, and selection. Over time, adaptations will encode biologically—such as an instinctive ability and desire to lead and to follow—if selective pressures
are strong, consistent, and persistent. Other evolutionary mechanisms will play out culturally
over a shorter time span—for example, management adopting hierarchical versus flat leadership structures to coordinate successfully.
This biology-culture connection provides us
with a clear set of evolutionary principles to
analyze simultaneously proximate, short-term
leadership issues as well as longer-range dynamics. This, in turn, takes us to the development of a recursive predictive model: specific
leadership traits will be selected for in a particular organizational niche, and the emergent
leadership will, over time, modify that niche and
codirect organizational change. Leadership is
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therefore a dual process that emerges from
and is the constructor of the organizational
environment.
Our model is based on the premise that leadership is a biologically and culturally adaptive
process that serves social systems by coordinating and directing effort (van Vugt et al., 2008).
The ability to form cohesive groups that effectively coordinate to achieve mutual goals can
ultimately enhance fitness (Couzin, Krause,
Franks, & Levin, 2005; Flack, Girvan, de Waal, &
Krakauer, 2006; Harcourt, Ang, Sweetman, Johnstone, & Manica, 2009). However, organizing the
efforts of groups—that is, interdependent individuals who share social identities and have
common interests— comes with costs and risks.
For example, if “group” is defined at the organizational level, then transaction costs of coordination are high because of the increased likelihood of divergent incentives and routines
among individuals and subgroups (Ren, Kiesler,
& Fussell, 2008). An example is the different
“pulls” that emerge from competing agendas
within some matrix-managed businesses. Firms
are continually under pressure to manage such
organizational challenges (Gulati & Singh,
1998). Should a firm, for instance, exploit a wellestablished niche or invest in exploration of a
new market for fear of becoming obsolete
(March 1991)? The risks associated with an increasing number of these coordination problems
can spark damaging conflicts over collective action decisions. It is the presence of such recurrent dilemmas in the environment that selects
for adaptive solutions (e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).
Thus, leadership can be defined initially as
an adaptive process where one or more individuals emerge as a focal point to influence and
coordinate behavior for solving social challenges posed by dynamic physical and cultural
environments (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994;
King, Johnson, & van Vugt, 2009; Nicholson, 2013;
van Vugt, 2006; van Vugt et al., 2008). Indeed,
over evolutionary time, environmental pressures facing human groups, such as intergroup
conflict, appear to have selected for leadership
as one of the principal devices for achieving
social coordination (e.g., Pearce, Conger, &
Locke, 2007; van Vugt, 2006; Vaughn, Eerkens, &
Kantner, 2010). In short, the interplay between
leadership and followership is a distinctly social process that addresses the critical issues of
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survival and reproduction (Kenrick, Li, & Butner,
2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998).
This argument in its general form is neither
unique nor revolutionary. However, a particular
developmental process of leadership has lacked
attention—the evolutionary shift from hunting
and gathering to agriculture (Richerson, Boyd, &
Bettinger, 2001; Rowley-Conwy & Layton, 2011)
and the postagrarian organizational transformations that resulted in a multiplicity of leadership structures. Investigating this evolutionary
trajectory helps to clarify the role of leadership
within the organizational processes of coevolution and niche construction, both as an agent of
selection and change and as an object of these
processes. In lay terms, leaders make history
and history makes leaders (Nicholson, 2013).
NICHE CONSTRUCTION THEORY
IN ORGANIZATIONS
A framework for understanding the coevolutionary nature of leadership and organizations
is niche construction theory (NCT), a young
branch of evolutionary biology that has become
a multidisciplinary movement involving evolutionary biologists, ecologists, psychologists, anthropologists, archeologists, computer scientists, philosophers, and others (Kendal, Tehrani,
& Odling-Smee, 2011; Laland & O’Brien, 2011).
Proponents of NCT have a fundamentally different view of how niches are constructed from that
typically found in the social and biological sciences (e.g., Chase & Leibold, 2003). In contrast to
traditional theories of evolution, in which researchers view organisms as molded by environmental pressures, NCT provides a second
route to the adaptive fit between organism and
environment by emphasizing the capacity of
species to modify environmental states. Niche
construction theorists propose that, in modifying
their own world, organisms frequently modify
the environments of other organisms that share
those environments. When beavers build dams,
for example, they affect considerably more than
the probability that genes for dam building will
spread. They also modify nutrient cycling and
decomposition dynamics, influence the character of water and materials transported downstream, and ultimately influence plant and community composition and diversity (Naiman,
Johnston, & Kelley, 1988). Importantly, the constructed niches also feedback on, and influence,
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the behaviors of the niche-constructing
organisms.
In the human context, niche construction is a
process by which we adjust our environment to
such a degree that we create our own selection
pressures, resulting in distinct adaptations.
Constructing niches that are focused on market
defense versus prospecting, for example, can
select for a diverging set of organizational
norms that emphasize the value of congruent
behaviors and styles, such as risk aversion at
the cost of exploratory innovation. From this perspective, one can use evolutionary mechanisms
to model how agents modify the organizational
environment and which adaptations are likely
to emerge.
The recursive process involves agents responding to fitness-relevant problems posed by
their environments and also setting themselves
new problems through niche construction. For
instance, niche orientations that emphasize the
interests of a singular shareholder group versus
multiple stakeholder groups can have downstream consequences on the preferential selection of organizational traits (e.g., Donaldson &
Preston, 1995). Specifically, Campbell (2007) has
argued that constructing a shareholder-oriented
niche can create coordination problems associated with short-term horizons and unsustainable
practices. This, in turn, creates new selection pressures favoring perhaps a more sustainable, stakeholder-focused orientation. NCT thus treats evolutionary change as resulting in part from
agents codirecting their own evolution (Laland,
Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000; Lewontin, 1983;
Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003).
The logic of NCT has long figured in the organizational behavior and management literature.
Graen (1975), for example, noted proactive role
making as a missing element in role theory. In
job design, a similar idea—job crafting— has
denoted the tendency of employees to actively
shape their jobs (Clegg & Spencer, 2007; Grant,
2007; Nicholson, 2010). In the careers literature,
Van Maanen and Schein (1979) coined the term
role innovation to capture a related concept,
which later became a central element in the
analysis of role transitions and the reshaping of
work environments (Nicholson, 1984). Sociologists have also favored the idea of “structuration,” capturing the interaction between people
and institutional structures (Orlikowski, 1992).
Much organizational development can be

294

Academy of Management Review

viewed through the NCT lens, such as firms
shifting gears in terms of technology, product
innovation, staffing criteria, and selection
processes.
NCT’s strength is in identifying how modifications to a niche, such as a shift in management
orientation, lead to the emergence of adaptive
traits and strategies favored in the selective environment over time (Laland, Odling-Smee, &
Feldman, 2001; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles,
2010; Odling-Smee, 1988; Rendell, Fogarty, & Laland, 2011). A primary factor contributing to the
progression of human niche construction is our
ability to acquire and transmit information
quickly through culture (Laland et al., 2000). Relative to genetic inheritance, cultural inheritance
can have a more immediate and profound influence on the selective environment because culturally inherited information is not bound by
purely genetic pathways for transmission. This
means that leadership can rapidly construct a
niche through cultural mechanisms.
Scholars have long argued that an essential
role of leadership is to shape and oversee the
development of organizational culture (e.g., Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008; Schein, 1985). For example, formal leadership in an organization
may decide to construct a flatter organizational
environment. This constructed niche will increase the fitness value and frequency of specific organizational traits, such as democratic
normative beliefs and associated behaviors (see
Haley & Sidanius, 2005). Yet, to continue with
this example, a flatter structure with democratic
norms may not provide the most advantageous
outcome in markets that reward problemsolving speed over problem-solving quality,
which tend to favor hierarchical networks (see
Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010). This
subsequently reintroduces pressure on formal
leadership to enact further niche modifications—in this example, restoring some hierarchical processes—to remain adaptive. Accurately representing this feedback loop between
leadership and the organizational niche helps
expose the intended and unintended effects
of coordinated behavior on organizational
development.
Importantly, our model does not assume that
all coordinated behavior is caused by leadership. Operational rules, norms, and shared motives—sometimes called “substitutes for leadership” (Howell & Dorfman, 1981)—are additional
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sources of coordination. Yet the efficacy of leadership as a solution to coordination challenges
derives from its ability to successfully promote
the execution of these alternatives. As an example, having a fraction of agents in a group willing to lead the enforcement of prosocial norms—
even at a personal cost— can significantly
enhance the effectiveness of coordination
(Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Gintis, 2000). In this manner some form of coercive leadership advocating affiliative norms can reinforce the observed
link between prosocial behavior and organizational commitment (Grant, Dutton, & Rosso,
2008). Leadership is therefore a central principle
of organization because it both initiates and facilitates effective coordination.
COORDINATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN LEADERSHIP
To appreciate the role of leadership in niche
construction, we briefly consider the evolutionary origins of the agricultural revolution. Understanding the emergence of formal leadership
and how it has been applied to solve problems
in groups potentially increases our foresight
about future organizational evolution. The origins of modern civilization were triggered by
climatic oscillations during the tail end of the
Pleistocene, circa 11,000 years ago, which depleted the resource base and intensified recurrent coordination problems, such as decisions
about group movement and intergroup and intragroup conflict (Richerson et al., 2001). These
pressures demanded increasingly sophisticated
coordination, and existing leadership tendencies were refined and expanded to solve this
problem (Flannery, 1968).
Prior to agriculture, hunter-gatherers maintained egalitarian leadership regimes, which
have been referred to as “reversed dominance
hierarchies” (Boehm, 1993), denoting a powersharing model with flexible leadership and the
censoring of what Boehm calls “upstartism.”
Postagricultural forms differed greatly, some retaining low-power models of leadership, such as
the highly collectivist lifestyle of pastoralists
(Nicholson, 2005), whereas others—precursors of
modern corporate cultures— enabled elaborate
resource-based stratification to evolve as a response to the new opportunity to accrue and
inherit resources, power, and wealth (e.g., Kirch,
1984; Service, 1975). This facility, in the context of
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fixed settlements, spawned larger and potentially more varied kinds of social networks. Increasing social complexity ushered in a new set
of adaptive challenges (O’Brien & Laland, 2012).
Human niches that arose during the agricultural
revolution required leadership that not only
could manage such essential activities as resource acquisition, distribution, and protection
but also could resolve an increasing number of
coordination dilemmas, such as managing
large-scale conflict within groups and between
groups. Table 1 shows the niche construction
trajectory from the emergence of large-scale formal leadership in the agricultural revolution to
the global leadership of the modern era.
Defining Formal Leadership
Leadership as an adaptive process for solving
these dilemmas comprises active agents who
modify culture, initiate niche construction, and
alter future environments—what scholars refer
to as “ecological inheritance” (Odling-Smee,
1988; Odling-Smee & Laland, 2011). The key difference between humans and other species,
even the closest primates, is the self-conscious
intentionality in our niche construction. It is humans’ overwhelming sense of agency, purpose,
expectation, and planning that forms the cognitive roots of the niche construction we call “culture building” (Nicholson, 2011).
Leadership supports niche construction
through directed coordination of individual activities to support the pursuit of joint goals (Hollander, 1992; van Vugt et al., 2008), where “coordination” is defined as “joint interactions that
are ‘self-policing’ because payoffs are highest if
everyone does the same thing” (Richerson, Boyd,
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& Henrich, 2003: 358). However, as group size
increased across human evolutionary history,
genetic relatedness among individuals’ decreased, thus enlarging the need for formal
leadership to maintain cohesion. The underlying reason for this increased formality is the
nepotistic tendency to favor genetically related
others (Hamilton, 1964; Neyer & Lang, 2003). This
can hinder large-scale, loosely related coordination as incentives splinter and resource competition between organizational subgroups intensifies (Ren et al., 2008). Thus, formal leadership
is a mechanism for maintaining adaptive levels
of cohesion between increasingly unrelated
group members to enhance the relative fitness
of an organization. This makes large-scale formal leadership an essential component to coordinate the behavior of loosely related groups in
competitive organizational environments.
Prerequisite Adaptations
Adapting to complex and dynamic environments in large-scale social groups requires a
flexible coordination strategy that is not tuned
to any specific environment (Bergstrom, 2002).
Leadership, as an evolving process, offers this
flexibility across a varied organizational landscape. It is able to serve equally the battle for
market share, the cultivation of prosocial human resource management, and the exploration of entrepreneurial opportunities (Zahra &
Pearce, 1990). In modern times, various styles,
such as transformational, transactional, or
stewardship paradigms, have emerged to enact distinctive coordinating strategies to solve
specific group problems (Bass, 1997; Davis et
al., 1997; Houghton & Yoho, 2005).

TABLE 1
Leadership Evolution from the Agricultural Revolution to the Modern Era
Organizational Properties

Agricultural Revolution

Industrial Revolution

Modern Era

Leadership milestones

Formalized leadership
stabilizes

Industrialized leadership
independent from traditional
ruling class stabilizes

Transnational corporate
leadership expands

Niche characteristics

⫺
⫺
⫺
⫺
⫺

⫺ Emergence of middle class
⫺ Emergence of modern unions
⫺ Per capita growth

⫺
⫺
⫺
⫺

Nested structure
Division of labor
Hierarchical
Centralized
Per capita subsistence
living

Globally diverse executives
Flatter
Decentralized
Global middle class growth
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In addition to flexible large-scale coordination, another component necessary for the development of postagrarian niches is rapid learning,
to ensure that group members know and play
their part. Humans, and to a limited degree
other primates, learn culturally—imitating others and transmitting knowledge within and between generations (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello,
2009). Because of this ability, we have been referred to as “the ultimate niche constructors”
(Odling-Smee et al., 2003: 28).
To execute large-scale niche construction in
competitive social environments, learning the
rules for coordination is paramount. Formal
leadership addresses this concern by increasing
the pace of cultural transmission through directed social learning, rather than by relying on
individuals to separately adopt their own models, which can decrease relative group cohesion.
Specifically, formalized leadership interacts
with culture to institutionalize norms and promote uniform enculturation. This is an outcome
that is especially desired in modern organizations, which typically comprise unrelated group
members who bring their own potentially divisive normative beliefs and practices into the
collective. Mentors, educators, and advisers are
roles that support the leadership goals of enculturation and niche construction.
THE MODEL: LEADERSHIP AND
NICHE CONSTRUCTION
Evidence for the importance of flexible leadership and cultural learning in human social
evolution is compelling. It is both fascinating
and helpful to understand what initially allowed us to cross the threshold from informal
leadership into formal, less genetically related
leadership, given that (1) natural selection focuses primarily on the individual level (Williams, 1966) yet (2) large-scale formalized leadership in loosely related social networks
typically involves an asymmetric payoff favoring the leader (i.e., a relative cost to the individual follower; Hammerstein, 2003). A related
question concerns why formal leadership was
able to stabilize in human culture, rather than
humans simply resuming a hunter-gatherer lifestyle when environmental pressures eased,
given the potential fitness costs associated with
transitioning to large-scale groups (Mummert,
Esche, Robinson, & Armelagos, 2011)? Finally,
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why did these increasingly formal leadership
strategies evolve into the modern structures we
currently observe, and what does this imply for
future organizational evolution?
It is becoming increasingly clear that embedded in these decision-making processes are the
basic mechanisms of evolution, which tend to
work on a subconscious level and fully account
for apparently nonrational choice (Aktipis &
Kurzban, 2004; Bentley, O’Brien, & Brock, 2014).
Regardless of whether the pressure is coming
from the natural environment or from an organizational niche constructed by leadership, there
will exist the same continuing and observable
cycle of variation, inheritance, and selection. Incorporating this logic into the study of organizational behavior generates a clear set of propositions for analyzing and predicting change
over time.
Leadership Propositions
To construct our model, we first consider why
and when agents sacrifice immediate selfinterest for the sake of the group, even when
payoffs gained from the sacrifice asymmetrically favor the leader. Multilevel selection theory deals with the inherent dilemma between
self and group when entering loosely related,
post-hunter-gatherer niches. Quite simply, if
competition between groups is stronger than
competition within groups, adaptations benefiting the group will emerge (e.g., Sober & Wilson,
1998). A version relevant to the study of organizations is referred to as “cultural group selection” (Henrich, 2004). The term followership investment (Spisak et al., 2011) can then be used to
capture this self/group trade-off and the opportunity it provides for formal large-scale organizational practices to evolve.
The act of following can be considered an
investment of capital, energy, time, or anything
else that is a potential cost to an individual in
order to accomplish organizational goals. This
form of large-scale, asymmetric coordinated investment is possible only if (1) there is a prevailing between-group pressure relative to withingroup pressure, such as market competition,
and (2) the perceived return on followership investment is sufficient to increase the fitness of
both the group and its individual members. Any
form of loosely related, large-scale coordination
without these basic rules of multilevel return on
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investment would revert to a more primitive
dominance hierarchy where a leader’s power
was absolute and coordination coerced, generally with minimal benefit to other group members (Wilson, van Vugt, & O’Gorman, 2008).
The payoffs, however, are perceived, of
course. Therefore, individuals may suspend immediate self-interest, despite the absence of a
clear long-term payoff. The general need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), for example,
can encourage followership investment in the
group far beyond what appears to be rational.
Withholding this fundamental need for sociality would constitute a cost on followers such
that going it alone would not be an option. The
Machiavellian tactic by some leaders of artificially raising the level of perceived external
threat to an organization is another approach
that can elicit an apparently irrational level of
followership investment. Finally, the presence
of actual market competition can also drive this
group-level participation. The central idea is
that multiple group-level pressures can encourage followership investment, and studying
these factors will add to our understanding of
organizational involvement and large-scale
coordination.
Proposition 1: Followers will be more
likely to pursue organizational goals,
even at a personal cost to immediate
self-interested goals, when withingroup (i.e., individual-level) perceived
competition is relatively less than between-group (i.e., group-level) perceived competition.
This adds a worthwhile multilevel dimension
to existing motivational theories, such as expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Specifically, by including the group-level variable, Proposition 1
predicts that employee motivation can remain
high, even when the valence of the expected
(individual-level) outcome is negative, provided
that the costs and benefits associated with perceived between-group competition are of
greater value than the costs and benefits assigned to within-group competition.
Although Proposition 1 provides the rationale
for large-scale niche construction, it does little
to explain how various leadership processes
stabilize (i.e., sustain followership investment
and become resistant to change). Research has
shown that firms battling for market share in
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highly competitive markets can sustain a high
level of performance with weak “dictatorship”
governance, whereas firms not facing intense
market competition perform better with good
“democratic” governance (Giroud & Mueller,
2011). Similarly, as Pierce and White (1999, 2006)
noted in nonhuman primate and human studies,
status-based dominance hierarchies stabilize in
ecologies where resources are highly contested
(i.e., clustered, predictable, and visible), but
egalitarian structures emerge where resources
are less contested (i.e., dispersed, unpredictable, and concealed).
We know that followers hold implicit leadership
prototypes based on a variety of these evolutionarily consistent group dynamics (e.g., Spisak et al.,
2011). Such fitness-relevant coordination problems can include not only the battle for market
share but the need for effective intragroup coordination (e.g., through human resource management practices), intergroup coordination (e.g.,
the management of postmerger integration), and
the recurrent dilemma between exploration and
exploitation. The main point is that specific coordination problems need to be solved in order
to maintain a relative level of organizational
fitness. Moreover, as we noted in relation to the
adaptive strategies of preagricultural groups,
context-specific leadership processes are selected and stabilized in order to address diverging coordination problems. One of the differences with modern organizational niche
construction, however, is that coordination challenges intensify when group members are unrelated and diverse. This spurs the evolution and
stabilization of more formalized leadership processes with the capacity to facilitate large-scale
niche construction.
Specifically, the personal cost associated with
followership investment in unrelated groups,
combined with a tendency to be self-interested,
creates a high level of investment risk (e.g.,
cheaters may shirk group-level responsibility or
leaders may attempt to exploit followers). Common to all coordination problems and subsequent niche construction in loosely related
groups is the need to find an adaptive balance
between individual-level investment and grouplevel payoff. Low relative payoffs in competitive
environments can threaten organizational fitness. This places a premium on the ability to
construct a niche that can stabilize adaptive
coordination at a higher level than in competitor
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organizations. Understanding how leadership
processes stabilize and facilitate fitness-enhancing niche construction is the next step in
explaining the evolution of leadership.
The logic of what have been called the three
Rs of human cooperation—reciprocation, retribution, and reputation (e.g., Boyd & Richerson,
1992, 2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Trivers, 1971)—
can be used to help explain how various forms
of formal leadership can occur. Once niche construction begins in an organization, formal leadership must emerge and deploy control mechanisms capable of eliciting the desired norm
conformity. A basic requirement for achieving
stability is ensuring that the perceived cost of
not following a norm is greater than the cost of
following it. This we define as “organizational
niche equilibrium.” It is a situation where the
costs of followers switching to available alternatives are too great and the benefits too little,
so the niche stabilizes. This can be achieved
through various forms of the three Rs.
Take, for instance, the construction of hierarchical versus flat organizational structures to
address coordination problems. Management,
working to construct a flatter, cooperative niche,
needs to maintain reciprocal relationships with
multiple subgroups and individuals across the
organization. This will likely select for a prosocial leadership process consisting of emotional
empathy and other affiliative traits to support
multiple streams of reciprocity. The construction
of a hierarchical niche, in contrast, creates a
rank order of agents where breaches of reciprocity with those lower in rank, such as frontline
employees, are likely to occur. Here costly retribution for not following the hierarchical norm
may be used to achieve niche stability. Typically, this happens because payoffs asymmetrically favor those at the apex of hierarchies,
rather than reciprocity governing exchanges at
all levels (Hammerstein, 2003). A constructed
niche of this kind will arguably select for a dominance leadership process that encourages vigorous methods of status acquisition and maintenance, such as aggressive behavior and
Machiavellian tactics. In this example we see the
beginnings of niche construction, where influential stakeholders such as executives and owners
modify the environment in an attempt to increase
the likelihood of success. The changed context
subsequently selects for niche-specific leadership
processes to sustain niche equilibrium.
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Once established, organizational niches select for relevant and valued characteristics
among agents that confer on them reputational
and material benefits. For example, a company
defending markets compared to one with a prospector orientation (Miles & Snow, 1978) will accord different value to risk-taking behaviors. Adhering to these niche-specific norms associated
with success can consequently add to a positive
reputation, increase status, attract cooperation,
and ultimately enhance fitness.
Proposition 2: Given group-level investment (Proposition 1), organizational
niche construction will stabilize under
the following conditions: (a) niche construction selects for niche-specific formal leadership processes that favor
varying degrees of reciprocity versus
retribution to sustain followership investment; (b) the selected process is contingent on the level of asymmetric payoff between agents embedded in the
niche (e.g., low asymmetry ⫽ increased
reciprocal strategies); and (c) niche-specific leadership receives higher reputational value (e.g., flat niche ⫹ prosocial
leadership ⫽ high reputation).
We argue that this underlying logic for sustaining followership investment and managing self/
group payoffs applies to all forms of organizational niche construction.
What the stabilization process identified in
Proposition 2 does not do, however, is account
for the actual modification and evolution of
large-scale formalized leadership over time. An
additional step is required to explain the wide
variety of leadership processes and niche types
visible in the organizational landscape. As with
all evolutionary mechanisms, stable variation of
multiple competing equilibria, such as hierarchical versus flat structures, is required for selection (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). “Multiple equilibria” means that diverging niche construction
gives rise to diverse leadership processes that
can become sufficiently stable (i.e., resistant to
change) to engage in competitive betweengroup selection. It is at this point where NCT,
with its emphasis on downstream behavioral
consequences, is perhaps most analytically
useful.
Machiavellian-type leaders, for instance, as a
result of self-interest, may attempt to sustain
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asymmetric payoffs by exploiting followers’
bounded rationality and emotions. Management
can signal high levels of explicit concern for
corporate social responsibility, in order to appear prosocial, while internal business practices remain nonreciprocating and “easily decoupled,” continuing to serve the implicit
financial and strategic goals of executives and
dominant shareholders (e.g., Weaver, Treviño, &
Cochran, 1999). Indeed, managing followers’
emotions is an essential part of the leadership
process (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough,
2009), which can potentially include the use of
prosocial “window dressing” as a means to create positive affect. However, we also predict that
most forms of asymmetric payoff will have limits and will self-regulate to more symmetrical
equilibria because of the cumulative nature of
cultural learning. Agents will come to recognize
the harmful downstream consequences of their
excessive self-interested behaviors and attempt
to initiate and stabilize fitness-enhancing alternatives. Gross asymmetries embedded in a
niche can quickly become unstable, requiring
modifications to the niche for it to remain viable.
Organizations are continually developing
these alternative leadership strategies and pitting them against each other in pursuit of market viability. The capacity for innovation, for
example, is highly advantageous in many markets. Proposition 1 dictates that a sustained
level of between-group competition will elicit
group-level investment. This implies that innovation is one organizational phenomenon that
creates the need for coordination. Further, Proposition 2 indicates that a particular leadership
process will be needed to stabilize the requirements of the situation. Thus, an intense level of
market share competition would imply the contingent selection of dominant, hierarchical leadership to quickly establish innovative supremacy. It is important to note that this kind of
competition aligns with the primate universal of
dominance hierarchy as a mechanism for
achieving individual-level success (Nicholson, 2013).
Innovation, however, is an example where a
leadership process based on dominance to enact “business warfare” can come to hinder competitive viability. Agents in a hierarchically organized niche may have restricted input and/or
may not perceive a reciprocal return on their
followership investment (recall that asymmetric
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payoffs typically favor those at the top) and,
therefore, may withhold a percentage of their
innovative output. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006)
use the phrase “shadow of the future” when
discussing concerns of reciprocity over time and
its impact on innovative performance. Conversely, for subgroups tasked with innovation,
we suspect an advantageous alternative is for
an organization to construct a niche of cooperation, rather than one of competition, by means of
a prosocial, affiliative leadership process. This
creates a flatter niche, which increases information flow, perceived reciprocity, and ultimately
innovative output. Simply stated, constructing
an organizational niche that stabilizes around
“how well we work together,” rather than “how
well we do against other groups,” can have a
profound evolutionary effect. Proposition 2 holds
that in order to construct such a niche, organizations can work to (1) ensure a sense of reciprocity, (2) enhance the reputation of cooperators, and (3) apply retribution to cheaters.
What priority is assigned to various organizational goals, such as innovation, postmerger integration, and various organizational hurdles,
depends on the importance of the challenge.
Additionally, how the organization coordinates
behavior in pursuit of these goals depends on
the type of niche construction established by
key stakeholders (e.g., decisions about hierarchy, division of labor, centralization, and other
pillars of organizational design; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Continuing with the innovation
example, assigning priority to innovation may
induce management to construct flat structures
with a multidisciplinary division of labor in order to stimulate and coordinate the processes of
invention. Leadership emerging from this orientation consequently sustains the niche
through application of the three Rs, which advances niche construction in the intended direction of flat and reciprocal. Again, the leadership process is both a driver and product of
organizational evolution, and cultural learning rapidly transmits and stabilizes subsequent adaptations.
Crossing the threshold into large-scale
groups was human evolution’s “big bang.” The
ability to niche construct on a large and complex scale, through the initiation and facilitation
of leadership, afforded humans the opportunity
to create more than enough stable variation to
fuel continuous organizational evolution. How
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an organization chooses to prioritize and coordinate its actions relative to those of its competitors forms the foundation of organizational
niche construction.
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FIGURE 1
An Evolutionary Cycle of Organizational
Leadership Resulting from Coordinated
Human Niche Construction

Proposition 3: Given group-level investment (Proposition 1) and the mechanisms
for constructing a stable niche (Proposition 2), large-scale formalized leadership
dynamics will evolve under the following
conditions: (a) organizations face multiple coordination problems with varying
payoffs; (b) strategic alternatives are prioritized to maintain relative fitness between organizations (e.g., high priority
assigned to innovation); (c) niche construction trajectories (e.g., hierarchal
versus flat orientations) set by influential
stakeholders select for multiple equilibria of niche-specific leadership processes (e.g., dominance versus prosocial),
which stabilize between organizations
(variation); (d) fitness-enhancing leadership processes increase in frequency
by means of cultural learning (inheritance), and processes with higher relative
payoffs between organizations persist
(selection); (e) group success decreases
group-level competition and increases
individual-level competition; and (f)
individual-level competition decreases
group-level fitness, which creates a feedback loop requiring further niche construction to maintain a relative level of
organizational success (see Figure 1).
One testable prediction that can be derived
from Proposition 3 is that as group-level competition increases globally—the rise of Asian
firms, for example— group-level investment
within competing firms will increase to sustain
relative fitness. This means that asymmetric
payoffs within an organization will decrease
and prosocial leadership processes will increase in frequency to secure increased levels of
reciprocity and group-level investment across
the organization. This prosocial switch will have
a cascading effect on other processes, such as
leadership emergence. Research has shown, for
instance, that followers tend to favor female
leaders in a prosocial context (e.g., van Vugt &
Spisak, 2008). Likewise, as we previously discussed, the increase in reciprocity should also
have a positive impact on the quality of innova-

tive output. Consequently, groups that successfully work together by enacting relatively more
adaptive leadership processes will increase the
overall fitness of each member (Sober & Wilson,
1998; Williams, 1966). Those groups, and ultimately individuals, maintaining larger and
more integrated networks are likely to have
greater intragroup stability, access to scarce resources, and success during intergroup compe-
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tition. They are also more likely to pass on their
acquired knowledge through cultural learning.
Hence, large-scale formal leadership is fundamentally a mechanism for expanding these
adaptive organizational networks.
Implications for Leadership and
Organizational Evolution
As groups become larger and more complex,
formalized leadership maximizes the benefit of
sociality by regulating tensions between individual- and group-level interests to ensure a
healthy level of group investment. This fitnessenhancing advantage of formal leadership
structures then spreads throughout large-scale
societies. The reason for such ubiquity is that
formal leadership is versatile enough to provide
the global institutional foundation required to
cooperate on a large scale (e.g., maintaining
relatively equitable payoffs), as well as the local
organization necessary to prioritize and manage
specific tasks. Leadership both defines organizational strategies and initiates collective action to achieve objectives.
The Coevolution of Formal Leadership and
Cultural Niches
What we observe in the postagrarian era, not
seen before, is a compounding effect of adaptation passing through larger, more complex social networks, which encourages the pathways
to increase in complexity as further niche construction occurs. For example, as a result of
niche construction, the level of sustainable
group density rises and formal leadership roles
emerge with greater refinement. These are the
downstream consequences. A larger population,
as a result of niche construction, creates increasingly complex networks, and subsequent
social stratification imposes structural constraints (i.e., formalized hierarchy)—further
downstream consequences. We suggest these
factors lead to exceptionally influential leadership opportunities, such as many CEO positions.
These leadership hubs have greater access and
control over resources and, thus, become focal
points of networks.
We argue that formalized leadership in its
many forms can exercise an unprecedented degree of control over network behavior and niche
construction. In essence, formal leadership pro-
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vides a degree of “direction” to organizational
evolution. As social complexity increases, the
possible directions to drive niche construction
diversify (Proposition 3). Leadership’s construction of relatively more successful niches will
typically increase a group’s status, causing others to adopt its fitness-enhancing cultural adaptations to remain competitive (e.g., Mesoudi,
2008). This involves cultural knowledge sweeping across social networks containing multiple
organizations. In these networks various alternatives undergo selection and adaptive information is transmitted. The communications supporting this diffusion can range from simple
proximity, such as familial transmission in
highly related groups (e.g., Henrich & Henrich,
2010), to complex interorganizational transmission via interlocking directorates (e.g., Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).
Research on firms, however, indicates that imitation is not costless (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).
A formalized leadership structure creates more
centralized power, which potentially influences
the trajectory of cultural evolution toward institutionalized norms that reinforce those in centralized positions— dominant shareholders, for
instance. This presumably results from the tendency to enhance individual-level success (Williams, 1966). Thus, niche construction activities
will likely include architecture designed to
asymmetrically channel benefits toward the top.
If centralized leadership in other groups begins
to adopt this self-interested strategy, then the
individual- and group-level balance necessary
to maintain formal structures is jeopardized. The
imbalance is likely to grow until the group,
including the leaders benefiting from such
asymmetry, fails. Proposition 3 states that an
important deterrent against such failure is
maintained by between-group competition (Figure 1). Thus, laws preventing monopolies and
other competition-reducing practices potentially
ensure equitable group investment and longterm organizational fitness, even for the monopolizing organization.
In the context of the leadership literature, this
balancing act between individual and group interests is the basis of leader-member exchange
and path-goal theories (e.g., Dienesch & Liden,
1986; House, 1971), which seek to explain why
certain maladaptive leadership traits do not
necessarily drive groups to extinction. In fact,
they rarely do (Laland & Brown, 2006). Any dis-
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parity in individual within-group fitness will
have a threshold based on perceived and actual
payoffs in competitive between-group environments so that overall group fitness cannot drop
below levels of other groups without negative
consequences for all individuals within the
group (Proposition 1). Formal leadership can
evolve to create stable hierarchical structures to
benefit group members unequally (Proposition 2), although this will be curtailed by adaptations for group-level investments that enable
organizations to meet the challenge of betweengroup competition (Proposition 3). For example,
training and development programs are grouplevel initiatives that restrict the ability of leaders to pursue cronyism by increasing expert
power across the organization through knowledge sharing.
The human ability to learn at a rapid pace,
together with a stable and cumulative transgenerational culture (Tennie et al., 2009), allows cultural
knowledge to spread through social networks.
This modifies the cultural niche and generates a
countervailing feedback pressure on formal
leadership. Thus, we observe a coevolution between leadership and niches in the pursuit of
organizational success. In this cultural space,
contrasting niche construction activities battle
for supremacy. By adjusting perceptions of costs
and benefits, competing leadership initiatives
can work to secure investments and stabilize
adaptations. Some groups might construct a hierarchical niche to encourage innovation,
whereas others might stabilize a flatter structure. The goal is to focus investment and to secure fitness in a competitive environment. This
drives the niche-constructing activities observed across organizations.
Limitations and Future Research
Although it is clear that formal leadership can
have a significant impact on success, we continue the search to improve our model. A number
of limitations and boundary conditions exist. For
instance, as an introduction to niche construction and formal leadership emergence, the current model would become too complex to cover
all aspects of the leadership process in one
stroke. Future versions will need to account for
emotions, personality, and other individual differences, as well as specific cultural and ecological variations. Such advances will increase the
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accuracy of modeling the coevolutionary relationship between leadership and organizational
niches.
To encourage continued model development,
our work has a number of implications for the
direction of research in leadership and organizational behavior. We have offered a framework
that connects both the social and biological perspectives on leadership by means of niche construction. It is valuable to consider a broader
understanding of human behavior, given the intimate connection between biology and culture
in our species. The biological sciences, for instance, provide insights into fundamental human tendencies, which help to clarify what adaptations are likely to occur under different
organizational pressures, whereas the social
sciences provide information about specific organizational environments. The main point is
that incorporating niche construction into the
organizational and management sciences unlocks a wealth of multidisciplinary research to
yield future insights.
Future work could also investigate other modifications of formal leadership resulting from
the multilevel tension embedded within postagrarian niches. It would be beneficial to understand how pressures in the environment, such
as the rise of market competition in developing
economies, influence the evolution of institutions and their leadership manifestations. We
suspect that management practices will need to
become significantly less hierarchical, dominant, and homogeneous to remain successful in
an increasingly connected, informed, diverse,
and alternative-rich environment (e.g., Bentley
et al., 2014). Digital communities provide employees with an ability to maintain highly networked, decentralized social links, enabling
rapid information sharing and the exploration of
opportunities on a global scale. Likewise, the
shift from nonrenewable to renewable energy
sources, as a result of an overly exploited niche,
is moving societies toward exploratory goals,
which implies a need for flatter, innovationfriendly leadership structures.
CONCLUSIONS
In preagricultural society, dramatic shifts in
the Pleistocene natural environment selected biologically for cultural learning and leadership
(Richerson & Boyd, 2000). We propose that in-
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creased stable transgenerational knowledge intensified social competition among groups and
activated group-level pressures that selected
culturally for the formalization of leadership.
This, in turn, facilitated the emergence of largescale organization. Niche construction in this
complex network created countless varieties of
organizational behaviors and leadership adaptations, which were, and continue to be, pitted
against one another in a seemingly endless
struggle. Cultural adaptations for formal leadership then modified niches, adjusting cultural
practices to secure an adaptive balance between individual- and group-level benefits.
History has witnessed huge variation in leadership forms, including despotic rule, transformational agents, industry bureaucrats, and
democratic representatives. We feel violated
when despots place too much emphasis on individual-level advantage, and we experience a
sense of security when our representatives work
to protect us from external threats and internal
power abuses. There is no doubt that considerable variation in formal leadership will persist
in the extreme diversity of modern institutional
niches. Under what circumstances is an unregulated for-profit model sustainable? Can a
highly centralized system compete with flatter
structures in the face of globalized competition?
How will cultural differences be leavened by the
shrinking geospatial effect of cyberconnectivity? Ultimately, it will be the quality of leadership and the willingness and ability of followers
to execute niche construction strategies that will
dictate the success and failure of future organizational forms.
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